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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the security of a distributed inner product (DIP) pro-
tocol [IEEE TIFS, 11(1), (2016), 59-73]. We show information leakage in this
protocol that does not happen in an ideal execution of DIP functionality. In
some scenarios, this information leakage enables one of the parties to completely
learn the other partys input. We will give examples of such scenarios.
Keywords: inner product, preprocessing model, secure computation, security
analysis
1. Preliminaries
1.1. Notations
In accordance with [1], in the following, we denote by Fq the finite field of
order q, by Fq
n the space of all n-vector with elements in Fq and by Fq
m×n
the space of all m × n matrices with elements belonging to Fq. We use over-
bar lowercase letters to represent vectors in Fq
n (e.g. a¯ represents a vector),
and bold uppercase letters to represent matrices in Fq
m×n (e.g. A represents a
matrix). We denote by x ∈R D the process of uniformly random sampling of
element x from domain D.
1.2. Distributed inner product functionality
The functionality considered in [1], is the distributed version of two-party
inner product (we refer to this functionality as DIP). In contrast to the conven-
tional inner product, in DIP the result is shared between parties. More precisely,
it is assumed that P1 and P2 hold private vectors x¯1 ∈ Fq
k and x¯2 ∈ Fq
k, re-
spectively, and intend to calculate w = 〈x¯1 · x¯2〉 such that for i = 1, 2 party Pi
receives an additive random share wi ∈ Fq satisfying w1 + w2 = w.
In an ideal world, this functionality is handled by a TTP as illustrated in Fig.
1. Since the TTP honestly follows the illustrated procedure, the output shares
are uniformly distributed on Fq and parties learn nothing about w = 〈x¯1 · x¯2〉
or the input of the other party.
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Functionality FDIP
Inputs: P1 and P2 hold x¯1 ∈ Fq
k and x¯2 ∈ Fq
k respectively.
Output: P1 learns w1 ∈R Fq and P2 learns w2 = 〈x¯1 · x¯2〉 − w1.
P1 : Sends x¯1 to TTP.
P1: Sends x¯2 to TTP.
TTP: Upon receiving x¯1 and x¯2,
• if x¯1 /∈ Fq
k or x¯2 /∈ Fq
k sets w1 = w2 = λ,
• otherwise, chooses u ∈R Fq , sets w1 = u and w2 = 〈x¯1 · x¯2〉 − u.
TTP: Sends w1 to P1 and w2 to P2.
Figure 1: The ideal functionality of distributed inner product (FDIP )
Remark 1. It is of vital importance to note the difference between DIP and
conventional inner product. In the latter, since the parties learn the product,
they always (even in the ideal world) can derive an equation for the other partys
input using their own input and output. But, derivation of such an equation is
not possible in the case of DIP ideal functionality.
2. DIP Protocol of [1]
In [1], David et al. propose a protocol to realize FDIP . Fig. 2 illustrates
this protocol (Protocol piDDG+). Protocol piDDG+ is designed in the prepro-
cessing model and planned to be universally composable and unconditionally
secure. In the preprocessing model, it is assumed that an initiator (denoted
by Init. in Fig. 2) distributes a set of correlated randomness between parties
before they decide (or fix) their inputs (preprocessing phase). After deciding
the inputs, parties compute the functionality with the aid of preprocessed data
(computation phase).
3. Security Analysis
A careful inspection of protocol piDDG+ reveals that it does not simulate
the ideal FDIP completely. It is easy to check this for k = 1, where the input
vectors reduce to scalar values. In this case, at the end of a run of protocol
piDDG+, P2 learns P1s input. In [2], authors ignore this case and reason that
DIP functionality inherently is not private for k = 1. As intuitively mentioned
earlier in Remark 1, it is the case for conventional inner product and not for
DIP. In the following proposition, we formally state an almost trivial security
property of FDIP which flatly contradicts the reasons given in [2].
Proposition 1. If pi is a protocol that securely computes FDIP for input vectors
of length k, then for every 1 ≤ k′ ≤ k, there is a protocol pik′ constructed with
black-box use of pi which securely computes FDIP for input vectors of length k
′.
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Protocol piDDG+
Inputs: P1 and P2 hold x¯ ∈ Fq
k and y¯ ∈ Fq
k respectively .
Result: P1 learns w1 ∈R Fq and P2 learns w2 = 〈x¯ · y¯〉 − w1.
Preprocessing Phase
Init.: Chooses x¯0, y¯0 ∈R Fq
k and computes s0 = 〈x¯0 · y¯0〉.
Init.: Sends x¯0 to P1 and (y¯0, s0) to P2.
Computation Phase
P2: Sends y¯1 = y¯ − y¯0 to P1.
P1: Checks whether y¯1 ∈ Fq
k:
• if y¯1 /∈ Fq
k, aborts and outputs w1 = λ,
• otherwise, chooses r ∈R Fq, computes x¯1 = x¯+ x¯0 and r1 = 〈x¯ · y¯1〉−r,
and sets w1 = r.
P1: Sends (x¯1, r1) to P2 and outputs w1.
P2: checks whether x¯1 ∈ Fq
k and r1 ∈ Fq:
• if x¯1 /∈ Fq
k, or r1 /∈ Fq aborts and outputs w2 = λ,
• otherwise, outputs w2 = 〈x¯1 · y¯0〉+ r1 − s0.
Figure 2: The DIP protocol of [1]
Proof. P1 and P2 perform protocol pik′ on inputs x¯ = (x1, x2, . . . , xk′ ) and y¯ =
(y1, y2, . . . , yk′) as follows:
1. They append a zero vector of length k − k′ to their inputs and form ex-
tended inputs as x¯e = (x1, . . . , xk′ , 0, . . . , 0) and y¯e = (y1, . . . , yk′ , 0, . . . , 0).
2. Then, they run pi on the extended inputs x¯e, y¯e, and receive w1 , w2.
3. They output w1 , w2.
It is easy to check that correctness and security of protocol pik′ reduces to
correctness and security of protocol pi. 
Now, it can be concluded that protocol piDDG+ does not realize FDIP for
k = 1 and therefore it is not secure. Protocol piDDG+ is insecure for k > 1 as
well. Particularly, P2 can always deduce an equation on P1’s input vector, x¯,
after receiving x¯1 = x¯+ x¯0. That is,
x¯1 = x¯+ x¯0
·y¯0
=⇒ 〈x¯1 · y¯0〉 = 〈x¯ · y¯0〉+ 〈x¯0 · y¯0〉
=⇒ 〈x¯ · y¯0〉 = 〈x¯1 · y¯0〉 − s0
Note that P2 is not able to deduce such an equation in the ideal run of DIP
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functionality. Therefore, Protocol piDDG+ leaks some information about P1’s
input beyond what is available in the ideal world. Technically, the ideal world
simulator fails to construct the view of a real world adversary that controls P2.
It is important to note that the simulation failure happens considering both
semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Hence Protocol piDDG+ is insecure in
both adversarial models.
The information leakage explained above, may seem harmless for large vec-
tors because the adversary learns virtually nothing about P1’s input. But,
regarding composition, this little information leakage will be a serious problem.
We demonstrate it in an example scenario.
3.1. Example scenario: multiplication of a vector by a matrix
Suppose that P1 has a 1 × k vector x¯ ∈ Fq
k and P2 has a k × k matrix
Y ∈ Fq
k×k and they intend to compute w¯ = x¯ ×Y in a shared manner. That
is, they want to receive random shares w¯1 and w¯2, correspondingly, such that
w¯ = w¯1 + w¯2. This computation will be trivial provided that P1 and P2 can
run an arbitrary number of instances of a universally composable protocol for
computing FDIP .
It is easy to check that protocol piDDG+ is completely insecure to be the
underlying DIP protocol for this scenario. Assume that P1 and P2 run protocol
piDDG+ to compute each element of w¯. We denote the ith element of w¯ by wi
and the ith column of Y by Yi. To compute wi, P1 inputs x¯ and P2 inputs Yi in
protocol piDDG+. The output of each party is a share of wi. In addition to its
output share, P2 derives an equation on x¯ from each run of protocol piDDG+ as
discussed above. After k runs, the parties receive their desired outputs. But, in
this state P2 has k equations on x¯ that will be enough to extract x¯ if they are
linearly independent. Specifically, if we denote by x¯i0, y¯
i
0 and s
i
0 the randomness
received by the corresponding parties in the preprocessing phase of the ith run
of protocol piDDG+, then the equation that P2 can deduce from the ith run will
be of the form
〈x¯ · y¯i0〉 = 〈x¯
i
1 · y¯
i
0〉+ s
i
0,
.
where x¯i1 = x¯+x¯
i
0 is the message that P2 receives from P1 in the ith run. Let Y0
be the matrix with y¯i0 as its ith column and q¯0 be the vector with 〈x¯
i
1 · y¯
i
0〉+ s
i
0
as its ith element. Now, we can write the set of these equations in the form of
x¯ ×Y0 = q¯0 which is a system of linear equations. Therefore, vector x¯ will be
found uniquely if Y0 is a non-singular matrix.
It is easy to extend above argument to matrix multiplication scenario and
therefore all linear algebra protocols of [1].
4. Conclusion
Inspection of the proof given in [1] and [2] for security of protocol piDDG+
reveals that, in the simulation process, the case of corrupted P2 is not discussed
in detail due to the apparent similarity to the case of corrupted P1. Considering
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the presented security flaw in this protocol, we can conclude a general recom-
mendation to avoid any frugality in the process of security proofs, especially
when tasks of parties are not exactly identical in the protocol.
In [1] and [2], various higher level privacy preserving linear algebra protocols
are proposed that the DIP protocol is their fundamental building block. For-
tunately, these higher level protocols use the DIP protocol as a black-box and,
thus, they can be implemented using any universally composable secure DIP
protocol.
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